How Hamas Can Be Destroyed With Military Force | Opinion

Recent events have reignited the debate over whether Hamas can be defeated militarily. Following President Donald Trump’s meeting with freed Israeli hostages in the Oval Office, he warned Hamas to release all captives or face severe consequences.

He also promised to send Israel “everything it needs to finish the job.” This pledge likely includes military supplies that were previously withheld under the Biden administration—such as large-diameter bombs and bulldozer parts—items Trump promptly released after the elections. The implicit message is clear: renewed military operations aimed at dismantling Hamas are on the table.

Some argue that Hamas cannot be destroyed through military means. This assertion not only misrepresents history but also ignores the shifting political and military realities of the battlefield. Dismissing Israel’s ability to dismantle Hamas militarily fails to account for the constraints the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) faced in the past 16 months and the unprecedented opportunities it may have in the future.

During the initial phase of the war, the IDF was forced to operate under significant restrictions not placed on militaries throughout history.

First, Arab nations—especially Egypt—pressured Israel to conduct military operations in a manner that left civilian populations in areas within Gaza rather than relocating them to safer zones outside the battlefield.

Hamas exploited this situation, using civilians and hostages as human shields and creating safe havens in areas the IDF was prevented from entering. Another of Trump’s proposals under consideration now is a temporary evacuation of civilians to neighboring nations, a move that could fundamentally alter the battlefield and remove one of Hamas’s key advantages.

Second, Israel faced external political constraints. The Biden administration and other international actors imposed severe limitations on IDF operations. These included withholding military aid, demands to not conduct operations in key Hamas strongholds like Rafah, unrealistic expectations of zero civilian casualties, and frequent pauses in combat due to humanitarian concerns based at times more on perception than verified data within Gaza. The IDF was even compelled to limit the scale of its operations from the beginning of the war, prolonging the conflict and allowing Hamas to regroup.

Third, the IDF’s operational focus was split. Israel had to divert substantial military resources to northern Israel to counter Hezbollah’s attacks and the persistent threats of a large-scale ground assault. Meanwhile, Israel also faced attacks from the extremist regime in Iran, as well as the Houthi insurgency in Yemen. These additional threats stretched IDF resources thin, preventing a fully concentrated effort against Hamas.

Should military operations resume, they will unfold under a vastly different set of conditions. The IDF is likely to receive increased U.S. political backing, ensuring fewer restrictions on military operations. There is a strong possibility that civilians in Gaza will be temporarily relocated, removing one of Hamas’s key defenses. Israel may also mobilize a greater number of forces than were used in the entirety of the war so far. Additionally, the IDF will benefit from battle-hardened troops, replenished supplies, and strategic adaptations made over the course of the war.

Just as importantly, Hamas is no longer the formidable force it was at the onset of the conflict. In October 2023, Hamas possessed five brigades, 24 battalions, tens of thousands of rockets, fortified defensive positions, and a well-trained leadership with decades of experience. Today, Hamas has been degraded into a guerrilla force with weakened leadership, reduced firepower, and limited capability to conduct large-scale operations. While still dangerous, Hamas lacks the centralized command structure, heavy weaponry, and defensive strongholds it once had.

To be sure, to decisively defeat Hamas, Israel will have to shift from its previous approach of raiding operations to a more methodical strategy. The IDF must fully seize and clear territory, rather than conducting short-term incursions. Notably, it was not until late 2024 that the IDF began systematically clearing portions of Northern Gaza, an approach that will need to be extended to the entire Strip. Once Hamas is militarily neutralized, Israel must ensure that the group cannot reconstitute itself, as it has in past conflicts.

This will likely require a temporary occupation of Gaza by the IDF or another security force to provide stability and prevent a resurgence of Hamas. While politically complex, securing and governing Gaza post-Hamas is essential to ensuring that a new militant force does not simply take its place.

Military success alone will not be enough. Hamas’s complete destruction—both militarily and politically—requires a clearly defined political end state. While Israel’s military actions can set the stage, Israel’s political leadership must outline a vision for a post-Hamas Gaza. Whether through direct Israeli administration, international oversight, or a Palestinian-led alternative government, the political future of Gaza must be determined to ensure that Hamas does not return under another name.

Yes, Hamas can be destroyed militarily. The constraints that once limited Israel’s ability to achieve this objective are changing, and with the right approach, Israel can dismantle Hamas’s military and political apparatus. However, victory requires not only battlefield success but also a long-term commitment to security and governance in Gaza. The opportunity is there—Israel and its allies must seize it.

John Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute (MWI) at West Point, codirector of MWI’s Urban Warfare Project and host of the “Urban Warfare Project Podcast.” He served for 25 years as an infantry soldier, which included two combat tours in Iraq. He is the author of the book Connected Soldiers: Life, Leadership, and Social Connection in Modern War and co-author of Understanding Urban Warfare.

The views expressed in this article are the writer’s own.